Category: Public Sector, Procurement & Privatisation

  • Raising the Bar: How Government Can Use its Economic Leverage to Lift Labour Standards Throughout the Economy

    Raising the Bar: How Government Can Use its Economic Leverage to Lift Labour Standards Throughout the Economy

    by Jim Stanford

    For at least five years now, Australia’s labour market has demonstrated signs of a structural shift that has undermined traditional patterns of wage determination, and eroded the quality and security of work. The economic and social consequences of this sea change in the world of work are severe and far-reaching: flat real wages (the worst labour income growth since the Great Depression), a severing of the traditional relationship between wage and productivity growth, a steady expansion of insecure work in various forms, growing inequality in income distribution (both between factors and across households), and a precipitous decline in collective representation and enterprise bargaining (especially in the private sector). Governments tell Australians to simply be patient, and let “market forces” do their work; wages will pick up and economic benefits will soon “trickle down.” But there is no reason to expect these concerning labour market challenges to resolve themselves. Instead, the whole history of Australia’s economy reminds us that pro-active policy efforts are always necessary to broadly distribute the fruits of economic growth to workers and their families.



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  • The Consequences of Fiscal Austerity in Western Australia

    The Consequences of Fiscal Austerity in Western Australia

    by Cameron Murray and Troy Henderson

    This report critically responds to the call for fiscal austerity and public sector downsizing, being made in response to the emergence of fiscal deficits in Western Australia (WA). Those deficits arose in the wake of the slowdown in mining activity and corresponding deceleration of employment and economic growth. Many observers immediately conclude that the only response to a deficit must be some combination of cutting program spending, reducing public sector employment, freezing or reducing public sector wages, and selling public assets.

    In reality, there should be no alarm about the WA state deficit. To the contrary, that deficit merely confirms that state fiscal policy is in fact doing what it is supposed to: namely, provide essential public services that make a key contribution to quality of life and the health of communities, and provide a solid base for private-sector economic activity (including helping to stabilise private-sector activity through its inevitable ups and downs). Knee-jerk spending cuts or asset sales in response to deficits that are caused by cyclical developments in the private-sector economy would only make matters worse in the short-run – and they would significantly undermine the public sector’s capacity to provide sustainable public services in the long-run.

    This paper explains the important economic functions played by the automatic stabilisers that are built into the tax-and-spending system of the state economy. It discusses the normal and even desirable functions of public debt, and catalogues the ongoing economic and social value of good quality public sector employment. All of these factors provide needed context for debates over the direction of fiscal policy in WA in the wake of the mining downturn and subsequent recession.

    The key findings and recommendations of the report include:

    1. A budget surplus can be a very effective way to slow economic growth, especially during a recession. The assumption that government should achieve a surplus as quickly as possible is fundamentally wrong.
    2. Deficits are acceptable – and positive – during periods of weak economic growth. Attempts to forcibly repair budget deficits during recessions will make the economic situation worse.
    3. Western Australia’s recent budget deficit is the result – not the cause – of deteriorating economic conditions. The budget deficit has helped to stabilise overall economic conditions in WA in an economically efficient manner.
    4. WA’s deficit and debt service charges are not large relative to the productive capacity of the state economy, nor to the overall revenue base of the state government. Indeed, WA’s interest payments are smaller as a share of total state government revenue than is the case for many large corporations and millions of households.
    5. The automatic stabiliser function of the budget should be amplified through additional discretionary counter-cyclical policy measures, such as increased government spending and investment during economic slumps.
    6. Privatisation of state assets is an accounting trick that does not actually improve the deficit (instead, it trades one asset for another on the government’s balance sheet), and will weaken the government’s fiscal position if the privatised asset generated revenue at a higher margin than the government pays interest on its debt.
    7. Public sector employment in WA has stagnated since the onset of the recession in 2013. In fact, Western Australia has the third lowest level of total public sector employment (14.5 percent) as a share of total employment of any state. The assumption that the state’s public sector is bloated is factually wrong. 
    8. Between 2013 and 2017, state public sector employment was essentially stable (at around 110,600 full-time equivalent workers). But during this period, WA’s resident population continued to increase (adding around 100,000 new residents). Therefore, WA’s public sector workforce has not kept up with the population it must serve.
    9. During the 2014 to 2017 recession, labour incomes in the private sector declined, shrinking at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent per year. In contrast, total wages and salaries paid in the public sector continued to grow at a modest but positive rate (of 3.9 percent per year). This continued, normal growth in public sector income helped to moderate the negative economic effects of the recession in the private sector.
    10. Like other forms of government spending, public sector payrolls acted as an automatic stabiliser during the recession – despite deliberate (and ill-advised) government efforts to suppress public expenditure. If public compensation had declined at the same rate as private compensation between 2014 and 2017, consumer spending, state output, and even the state government’s own revenues would have been lower than they were.



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  • A Portable Training Entitlement System for the Disability Support Services Sector

    A Portable Training Entitlement System for the Disability Support Services Sector

    by Rose Ryan and Jim Stanford

    A new proposal for a portable training system for disability support workers under the NDIS would help to ensure the program achieves its goal of delivering high-quality, individualised services to people with disabilities. The proposal is developed in a new report from the Centre for Future Work.

    Under the plan, disability support workers would receive credit for one hour of paid training, for every 50 hours worked in NDIS-funded service delivery.  Those credits would be vested with each individual worker, allowing them to accumulate credits even if they work for multiple employers or directly (as sole traders) for NDIS participants.  The training system thus takes account of the very flexible and mobile nature of work in this growing sector. 

    The system would allow a typical disability support worker to access one three-day upgrading course per year. A corresponding system of advanced recognised qualifications (and matching job classifications) would provide specialised pathways allowing disability support workers to develop their careers over time, thus reducing the very high staff turnover that has bedevilled the roll-out of NDIS services.

    The proposal is detailed in a new 70-page report, A Portable Training Entitlement System for the Disability Support Services Sector, co-authored by Dr. Rose Ryan and Dr. Jim Stanford.

    The NDIS has the potential to enrich the lives of people with disabilities through customised individual packages of services. But to achieve that goal, the system must facilitate ongoing investments in specialised skills and qualifications, rather than relying on short-term ‘gigs’ performed by high-turnover, casualised workers.

    Most disability support workers are employed in part-time or casual jobs, and spending on staff training by established service providers has shrunk as the NDIS has been rolled out.  The NDIS is expected to spur massive job-creation in coming years, adding as many as 70,000 full-time-equivalent positions, but evidence is accumulating that the quality of many jobs is very poor, undermining stability of the workforce and the quality of delivered services.

    Cost estimates suggest the overall scheme would require $192 million per year in additional funding, which the authors suggest should be delivered through a separate state-Commonwealth funding stream (to avoid undermining the revenue base for delivered services). Compared to the $22 billion annual pricetag for the NDIS, the authors suggest this cost is modest: less than one cent on the dollar to support the development of a workforce with state-of-the-art knowledge and training.



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  • False Economies: The Unintended Consequences of NSW Public Sector Wage Restraint

    False Economies: The Unintended Consequences of NSW Public Sector Wage Restraint

    by Troy Henderson and Jim Stanford

    Budget-cutting political leaders regularly target the jobs and incomes of public sector workers as the first and most politically convenient target of their austerity measures. But their crusade to balance the books by downsizing headcounts, intensifying work, and freezing the pay of the workers who deliver essential public services can backfire. In this new report, Troy Henderson and Jim Stanford consider the unintended consequences of one prominent austerity measure: the cap on public sector wage increases that has been in place in New South Wales since 2011.

    The report considers the fiscal and economic context for the pay freeze, disproving claims that public sector employment was “bloated” before the freeze was imposed.  It then lists five unintended, harmful side-effects of the ongoing wage cap, including:

    1. Over the five years from 2011 through 2016, the state’s public sector wage suppression reduced consumer spending in the state by a cumulative total of some $3.4 billion, harming businesses large and small.
    2. Australia’s national GDP was reduced by an estimated cumulative total of almost $8 billion over the 2011-16 period.
    3. The NSW government’s wage austerity therefore reduced its own revenue (through that reduction in GDP) by an estimated $1.2 billion over the 2001-16 period.
    4. Each public sector worker’s “workload” increased by 7.5 percent in the last five years – yet the wages policy in fact suppresses true productivity growth in the public sector.
    5. The NSW government’s extraordinary interventions, removing normal wage bargaining rights from a significant and influential section of the state labour market, have contributed to the unprecedented stagnation of wages in the overall state labour market – one that the government itself admits is hampering both economic growth and fiscal well-being.

    The longer the wage cap remains in place, the larger will these costs (of foregone consumer spending, offsetting reductions in state revenues, and the spillover impact onto private labour market outcomes) become.

    This report was commissioned by the NSW branch of the Health Services Union.



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  • Penny Wise and Pound Foolish

    The state government of New South Wales recently awarded a contract for the purchase of 512 new intercity passenger rail cars to a consortium that will manufacture the equipment in South Korea.  The contract is worth $2.3 billion, including an unspecified sum to cover maintenance of the double-decker cars over an initial 15-year period.  The government chose to import the cars from Korea instead of purchasing made-in-Australia products, claiming this was the “cheapest” option.  However, major government purchases have important indirect effects on many economic, social, and fiscal variables: including GDP, employment, incomes, exports, and even government revenues.  A comprehensive cost-benefit analysis must take those broader impacts into consideration; governments should make decisions that maximize the overall social net benefit of procurement, not simply minimize the up-front purchase cost to government.

    This paper reviews the economic importance of the railway equipment manufacturing sector in Australia, and describes its broad economic benefits: supporting 5000 direct jobs, and many more than that in supply industries and downstream consumer industries.  And it provides an illustrative simulation to show that offshoring this new contract could deprive the government sector of a cumulative total of $455 million in forgone revenue — as a result of lower GDP, employment, and incomes.  That is considerably more than any supposed “cost penalty” to government incurred as a result of manufacturing the equipment in Australia.  Worse yet, the NSW decision undermines attempts to coordinate and schedule upcoming railway rolling stock purchases from various governments across Australia, in order to maximize the economic benefits from future transit investments.



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